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U.S. DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.

★ JAN 28 2020 ★

BROOKLYN OFFICE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JON KAHEN, a/k/a JON KAEN, GLOBAL  
VOICECOM, INC., GLOBAL  
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES  
INC., and KAT TELECOM, INC.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No.

CV 20 - 00474

COGAN, J.

**DECLARATION OF ASHLEA BOWENS**

I, Ashlea Bowens, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth below, and if called as a witness I would testify as follows:

1. I am a Postal Inspector with the United States Postal Inspection Service ("USPIS"). I have been employed as a Postal Inspector since 2012, and am currently assigned to the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Consumer Protection Branch to investigate violations of federal criminal law, including mail and wire fraud schemes under Title 18, Sections 1341 and 1343, of the United States Code. Since being employed as a Postal Inspector, I have led, conducted, and participated in criminal investigations involving mail fraud, wire fraud, government impersonation, mail theft, identity theft, assault, robbery, and homicide. I have also successfully completed various training programs provided by the USPIS and the DOJ, including money laundering and asset forfeiture.

2. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based on my personal knowledge, knowledge obtained during my participation in this investigation, information from other individuals

including other law enforcement officers, complainants, and other parties, witness interviews, and my review of documents, public records, USFIS records, and other sources. Because this declaration is submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause in support of the application for a temporary restraining order, it does not set forth each and every fact that I learned during the course of this investigation.

**KAEN AND THE DEFENDANT ENTITIES ENGAGE IN THE FRAUDULENT  
ROBOCALLING SCHEMES FROM KAEN'S RESIDENCE IN  
GREAT NECK, NEW YORK**

3. This investigation involves robocalling fraud schemes conducted and facilitated by Jon Kaen, also known as Jon Kaen ("Kaen"), through the entities Global Voicecom, Inc., Global Telecommunication Services Inc., and KAT Telecom, Inc. Kaen also carries out these robocalling schemes using the business name IP Dish. Documents and other evidence obtained in the course of this investigation demonstrate that Kaen resides in Great Neck, New York, in the Eastern District of New York. Kaen operates and controls the Defendant entities from his home, and does so without meaningful distinctions between the entities and IP Dish.

4. Records uncovered in the course of this investigation reveal the use of the same email address for email communication with vendors and others on behalf of more than one of the Defendant entities, commingling of finances between the Defendant entities, a common business address that is not actually a business premises, and substantial activity furthering the fraudulent schemes conducted from Kaen's home. Based on my training and experience, I understand that fraudsters often use aliases, shell companies, and similar artifices in furtherance of their fraudulent schemes, to hide their activities, the location of their activities, and their identities from law enforcement and others.

5. Global Voicecom's most recent Form 499 filing with the Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC") lists a "headquarters" address at 15 Cuttermill Road, Suite 251, in Great Neck, New York. *See* Exhibit 1. Bank statements from TD Bank in the name of Global Telecommunication Services display this same address. However, this is not an actual office from which either Global Voicecom or Global Telecommunication Services operates. Rather, it is what is known as a Commercial Mail Receiving Agency ("CMRA"), which under U.S. Postal Service regulations is a for-profit business that offers rented mailboxes to the public, often along with other retail services. The CMRA at 15 Cuttermill Road in Great Neck, New York is called "Cuttermill Mailroom." Under Postal regulations, a CMRA's rental mailbox client must provide identification and complete a PS Form 1583 that identifies the mailbox's user. The PS Form 1583 for rented mailbox #251 at Cuttermill Mailroom is dated November 2019 and shows that the mailbox is rented in the name of Jon Kaen. *See* Exhibit 2. In my training and experience, it is common to encounter the use of CMRAs in fraud investigations, because it provides a individuals a means to conceal the true base of their operations, as the PS Form 1583 is not available to members of the general public.

6. Analysis of IP addresses demonstrates that Kaen operates the Defendant entities and IP Dish from his residence in Great Neck, New York. Public real estate records from Nassau County, New York show that Kaen owns his residence. Records from Verizon, a provider of home internet service, show that it provides Internet service to Kaen at that residential address. Verizon's records show the IP addresses associated with Kaen's home internet service. Examination of numerous records from GoDaddy, Google, Paypal, and other sources show that Kaen controls the Defendant entities and IP Dish through his home Internet service.

a. Such records show that Kaen uses and controls the email address referred to in this Declaration as “[XXXXXX]75@gmail.com.” On July 10, 2019, a Paypal account associated with the [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com email address was accessed from Kaen’s home IP address. During the Paypal session in which the IP address was accessed, Kaen’s residential street address was added to the Paypal account. This Paypal account is used in Kaen’s business operations.

b. On at least 23 occasions in 2017, 2018, and 2019, the GoDaddy account associated with the globalvoicecom.com domain was accessed from Kaen’s home IP address. This GoDaddy account is listed under the name “Jon Kaen,” with a listed physical address of the Cuttermill Mailroom rental mailbox in Great Neck, New York.

c. On July 16, 2018, the [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com email responded in the name of “KAT NOC” to another telecommunications company from Kaen’s home IP address. In the course of this investigation, I learned that “NOC” is a common abbreviation in the telecommunications industry and means “network operations center.”

d. Emailing from his home IP address, Kaen responded to a subpoena from the FCC about a foreign consulate imposter scam in the name of “IP Dish NOC” and corresponded extensively with vendors and customers of his businesses using one or more Global Voicecom email addresses.

7. Emails to and from the address [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com demonstrate that Kaen corresponds in the name of KAT Telecom and IP Dish, and operates the Defendant companies by directing their financial transactions. For example:

a. On January 31, 2018 the [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com address was used to send email to another business in the name of IP Dish and was used on June 19, 2018 to

correspond with the FCC in the name of “IP Dish NOC.” Email header information shows that the June 19, 2018 emails from “IP Dish NOC” to the FCC were sent from Kaen’s home IP address.

b. On July 16, 2018, the [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com address was used to send a message to another business. That message was signed “KAT NOC.” The [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com address received pricing information in the name of “KAT Telecom” from that same business on October 24, 2018.

c. On February 19, 2018, a vendor sent an invoice to Global Voicecom to “GVC Invoice” at the [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com address and three email addresses in the globalvoicecom.com domain, including to “Jon Kaen.”

d. On October 17, 2018, Paypal sent an email to [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com addressed to “GTSI.”

e. In a June 13, 2018 email chain between a vendor and the [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com address, which includes a Global Voicecom email address in the cc line, the participants discussed difficulties with failed calls.

8. Further, Defendant Kaen and the various Defendant companies commingle their finances. For example:

a. Paypal records for an account in the name of Kaen are registered with the email addresses [XXXXX]@globalvoicecom.com, [XXXXXXXX]@globalvoicecom.com, and [XXXX]@me.com. This Paypal account is linked to three accounts at TD Bank. According to the Paypal records, these three TD Bank accounts are in the name of Global Voicecom. Records from TD Bank for an account in the name of Global Telecommunication Services, Inc. show numerous transfers from those Global Voicecom

TD Bank accounts to the account held in the name of Global Telecommunication Services, Inc. One of those Global Voicecom TD Bank accounts is the account into which victim W.W.'s \$499 check was deposited. See ¶ 16. Such transfers consisted of tens of thousands of dollars per month between October 2018 and January 2019, the period for which we obtained statements in the course of our investigation. The Global Telecommunication Services TD Bank account is used to conduct Paypal transactions in one of Kaen's Paypal accounts. The Paypal account also displays an account holder name of "GTSI," which are the initials of Global Telecommunication Services Inc. The Paypal account registered with the [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com email address reflects an additional email account in the @globalvoicecom.com domain, and shows Kaen's home address and the Cuttermill Mailroom rental mailbox as physical addresses for the account.

b. On September 15, 2017, the email address [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com was used to send an email to an IP Dish vendor. The email sent from that address stated "This is to advise that any and all payments remitted by Global Voicecom, Inc. via PayPal, ACH, Wire and/or direct deposit are to be credited to the account of IP Dish."

c. An email sent from Paypal on October 17, 2018 and sent to "Jon Kaen" at the [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com address stated that "GTSI" sent \$2,184.65 to "Global Voicecom, Inc."

d. An email the Global Voicecom "Finance Director" sent to a vendor (copying [XXX]@globalvoicecom.com and [XXXXXX]75@gmail.com) on February 20, 2018 stated that Paypal payments from "GTSI" were to be credited to the account of "Global Voicecom, Inc."

### **VICTIMS OF THE FRAUDULENT ROBOCALLING SCHEMES**

9. In the course of our investigation, I and other investigators interviewed several victims of the Defendants' fraudulent robocall schemes.

10. One such victim is A.P., age 21 and a resident of Queens County within the Eastern District of New York, who paid \$4,500 to perpetrators of an SSA-imposter scam in March, 2019. A.P. stated that she received a recorded message on her cell phone stating that her social security number had been associated with a crime in Texas. A.P. then called the number the voicemail instructed her to call, and spoke with a man who identified himself as a police officer in Texas. The man asked A.P. to provide her social security number to confirm her identity, and then told her that her social security number was found in a car, with blood, at a crime scene. The man then told A.P. that her social security number was therefore "on hold," that her bank accounts were frozen, and then transferred her call to "SSA Agent Michael B. Johnson," who claimed to be an SSA official and repeated the same story about the crime scene. "Agent Johnson" then told A.P. that her money was going to be seized and not returned because of what was found at the crime scene, but if she wanted to keep her money she needed to move it from her bank account to a security deposit box held by the government, and that the only way to do so was to transfer her money onto Google Play gift cards. "Agent Johnson" told her to go to stores near her home to buy the gift cards, and A.P. did so, buying five \$500 gift cards totaling \$2,500, and read the cards' numbers to "Agent Johnson" over the phone as he instructed. A.P. did not have sufficient credit on her credit card to buy more Google Play cards, so "Agent Johnson" told her to withdraw money from her bank account and that he would call her the next day to get the numbers and send police officers to pick up the cards and take them to the government's security deposit box. A.P. did as



instructed, withdrawing \$2,000 in cash, buying four more \$500 gift cards, and providing the numbers over the phone. No one ever came to pick up the gift cards, and A.P. lost a total of \$4,500.

11. A.P.'s cell phone number ends in -1652. As detailed in Special Agent Sean Fagan's Declaration filed in this matter, Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC ("Blitz Telecom") provided 902 direct-inward-dial ("DID") numbers to Global Voicecom that are used as return-calling numbers for the Defendants' robocalling schemes. Call records provided by Blitz Telecom show a March 26, 2019 call lasting 3,602 seconds (approximately 60 minutes) between A.P.'s cell phone ending in 1652 and one of the 902 DID numbers Blitz Telecom provided to Global Voicecom.

12. Another victim is J.B., age 33 and a resident of Kings County within the Eastern District of New York, who paid \$700 to the perpetrators of an IRS-imposter scam. J.B. stated that he received a call in April 2019 from someone who said they were calling from a police station in Texas and was either an IRS Agent or a police officer. The caller claimed that J.B.'s identity had been stolen and used to rent a car that was used in illegal activities in Texas. The caller transferred J.B. to another person who said he was an IRS Agent, gave him a badge number, and said that J.B.'s would be "locked out" of his bank accounts unless he withdrew all of the money in those accounts, purchased Google Play gift cards, and provided the gift card numbers to the "IRS Agent" for safekeeping. J.B. did as he was asked, because he was alarmed and wanted to comply with a request from someone he believed to be a law enforcement officer. J.B. stayed on the phone with the "IRS Agent" while he withdrew \$700 from his bank account and purchased two Google Play gift cards, one for \$500 and one for \$200. J.B. then provided the gift card numbers over the phone. J.B. soon thereafter realized he was defrauded. He looked up the Texas police station the caller claimed to have called from, and found that it did not exist.



13. J.B.'s cell phone number ends in -8805. Call records provided by Blitz Telecom show two April 29, 2019 calls between J.B.'s cell phone ending in 8805 and one of the 902 DID numbers Blitz Telecom provided to Global Voicecom. One of the April 29, 2019 calls lasted 3,287 seconds (approximately 54 minutes) and the other lasted 687 seconds (approximately 11 minutes).

14. Another victim, A.V., age 38 and a resident of Queens County within the Eastern District of New York and paid \$11,212 to the perpetrators of an SSA-imposter and Treasury-imposter scam. A.V. stated that he received a voicemail message on his cell phone in May 2019 stating that he needed to return the call to SSA about an investigation involving his social security number, and that if he did not call, there would be further investigation. A.V. called the number that was left in the voicemail message and spoke with a woman he could not understand because of her African accent. A.V. said the woman became angry and disconnected the call. A.V. remained concerned about the purported investigation and called the number again, this time speaking with a man who identified himself as "Joshua Brown" and stated that he worked for SSA. "Brown" provided A.V. with "badge number 784961" and a code to prove "Brown's" identity: "DC77017 TX FBI privacy 1978." A.V. was then transferred to speak to another man who identified himself as a U.S. Treasury Agent named "David Thomas." "Thomas" demanded that A.V. send photos of his driver's license and social security card, which A.V. did by texting the photos to a number "Thomas" provided. "Thomas" then told A.V. that his social security number was used to rent a car found outside of a house in Texas, that a U.S. Marshall found twenty pounds of cocaine in the house where the car was parked, and that as a result the government was going to close A.V.'s bank accounts and seize his money. "Thomas" further told A.V. that the only way to keep his money was to transfer it to a security deposit box held by the U.S. Treasury. "Thomas" asked for details about A.V.'s accounts, which A.V. provided. "Thomas" then instructed A.V. to

withdraw all of his money in cash, to place the cash in between pages of a magazine, and to send the money to an address in New Jersey, overnight, with no signature requirement. "Thomas" also instructed A.V. that if the bank teller asked why he was withdrawing the money, A.V. should say that he needed to pay for a medical emergency. A.V. complied with these instructions. A.V. withdrew \$8,185 from his checking account and \$3,027 from his savings, and sent the money to the address in New Jersey by Federal Express. "Thomas" told A.V. that another "Treasury agent" would come to his home the next day to provide him a key to the security deposit box so that A.V. could get his money back and issue him a new social security number. When no "agent" came to see A.V., he called the number "Thomas" provided him for texting the photos and asked why no one came. "Thomas" told him that it takes time for new social security numbers to be issued, and that he could expedite the process if A.V. paid an additional \$3,000. A.V. responded that he had no more money, and "Thomas" asked him who he lived with and whether he could get the money from that person. At this point, A.V. realized he had been defrauded and disconnected the call with "Thomas."

15. A.V.'s cell phone number ends in -9289. Call records provided by Blitz Telecom show two calls between A.V.'s cell phone ending in 9289 and one of the 902 DID numbers Blitz Telecom provided to Global Voicecom. The first call occurred on May 6, 2019 and lasted for 453 seconds (approximately seven minutes). The second call occurred on May 7, 2019 and lasted for 3,587 seconds (approximately 59 minutes).

16. Another victim, W.W., is 76 years old and a resident of Virginia. She stated that in April 2019, a popup message appeared on her computer claiming that her computer needed virus protection. The message provided a phone number to call. When she called the number, she was offered "lifetime" computer virus protection for \$499. W.W. informed the person on the phone

that she was only able to pay by check. The speaker told her to write a check payable to Global Voicecom, Inc. W.W. does not remember exactly where she mailed the check, but recalls it was to a location in New York. W.W. followed the instructions she was given about downloading the virus protection, but believes it was worthless and did not do anything. A copy of W.W.'s check is attached as Exhibit 3.


17. W.W. stated that in September 2019, the people who sold her the "virus protection" software called her back and told her that selling her the software was a mistake, and that they wanted to refund her money. W.W. believed the caller had an Indian accent. W.W. asked the caller to just send her a check, but the caller said that would not be possible and that they needed to transfer it directly into her bank account. W.W. refused, thinking this was odd. She also refused because she did not bank online. W.W. received numerous calls from these individuals over the ensuing weeks, eventually agreeing to enroll in online banking to receive a refund from what she thought was Global Voicecom. W.W. eventually allowed one of the callers to "remote" in to her computer while she was on the phone with them. She logged into her online banking while the caller had remote access into her computer. The caller told her he was going to transfer \$500 directly into her account. The caller said he did so, but then told W.W. that he had made a mistake and transferred \$45,000 instead of \$500. The caller said that he and others were likely to lose their jobs, and that W.W. had to wire the money back to an account that he would provide. W.W. said that after the fraudster told her this, she could see that he had transferred \$45,000 from her savings account to her checking account. The fraudster then gave her wiring instructions to send the "overpayment" back to "the company" at a bank in Hong Kong. The fraudster told W.W. to lie to the bank about why she was wiring the money to Hong Kong, such as by saying that she wanted the money to pay for a vacation or an adoption, or else the bank would not let her send the wire.

The fraudster then told W.W. to get a cashier's check and to remain on the phone with him while she went to the bank to get the check. Before she went to the bank, W.W. wrote out a note to hand to the bank tellers, stating that: "I am being hacked. They are still on my cell phone. Please freeze my acct right now. Also my online banking. They are also holding on to my computer. They might have already gotten all of my money! I will be telling you a lie about why I am sending this much money."

18. W.W. provided agents with a copy of her cell phone bill, which shows a 55 minute call with 347-[XXX]-[XXX] on September 18, 2019. 347-[XXX]-[XXX] is one of the 902 phone numbers provided to Global Voicecom by Blitz Telecom. Call records provided by Blitz Telecom also show a September 18, 2019 call that lasted 3,254 seconds (approximately 55 minutes) between W.W.'s cell phone number ending in 6667 and number 347-[XXX]-[XXX].

19. W.W. stated that she never received a refund from Global Voicecom for the \$499 "virus protection."

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Executed on January 21, 2020, in Central Islip, New York.



Ashlea Bowens  
Postal Inspector  
United States Postal Inspection Service

# Exhibit 1

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### FCC Form 499 Filer Database DETAILED INFORMATION

[Form 499 Filer 822986 RSS Feed](#)

#### Filer Identification Information:

499 Filer ID Number: 822986  
Registration Current as of: Apr 1 2019 12:00AM  
Legal Name of Reporting Entity: Global Voicecom, Inc.  
Doing Business As: Global Voicecom  
Principal Communications Type: Toll Reseller  
Universal Service Fund Contributor: No  
(Contact USAC at 888-641-8722 if this is not correct.)  
Holding Company:  
Registration Number (CORESID): 0007050909  
Management Company:  
Headquarters Address: 15 Cuttermill Road  
Suite 251  
City: Great Neck  
State: NY  
ZIP Code: 11021  
Customer Inquiries Address: 15 Cuttermill Road  
Suite 251  
City: Great Neck  
State: NY  
ZIP Code: 11021  
Customer Inquiries Telephone: 516-986-4806 Ext:  
Other Trade Names:

#### Agent for Service of Process: Local/Alternate Agent for Service of Process:

Telephone:  
Extension:  
Fax:  
E-mail:  
Business Address of Agent for  
Mail or Hand Service of Documents:  
City:  
State:  
ZIP Code:

D.C. Agent for Service of Process: George Foote  
Dorsey & Whitney LLP  
Telephone: 202-442-3518  
Extension:  
Fax: 202-442-3199  
E-Mail: [foote.george@dorsey.com](mailto:foote.george@dorsey.com)  
Business Address of D.C. Agent for  
Mail or Hand Service of Documents: 1801 K Street NW  
Suite 750  
City: Washington  
State: DC  
ZIP Code: 20006

#### FCC Registration Information:

Chief Executive Officer: Jon Kaen  
Business Address: 15 Cuttermill Road  
Suite 251  
City: Great Neck  
State: NY  
ZIP Code: 11021

Chairman or Other Senior Officer:  
Business Address:  
City:  
State:  
ZIP Code:

President or Other Senior Officer:  
Business Address:  
City:

State:  
ZIP Code:

Jurisdictions in Which the Filing Entity Provides Telecommunications Services:

New York

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FCC Form 499 Filer Database Software Version 01.03.06 July 21, 2011

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Federal Communications Commission 445 12th Street SW Washington, DC 20554 <a href="#">More FCC Contact Information...</a>				Phone: 1-888-CALL-FCC (1-888-225-5322) TTY: 1-888-TELL-FCC (1-888-835-5322) Fax: 1-866-418-0232		<a href="#">Privacy Policy</a> <a href="#">Website Policies &amp; Notices</a> <a href="#">Required Browser Plug-ins</a> <a href="#">Freedom of Information Act</a>	



# Exhibit 2

United States Postal Service

**Application for Delivery of Mail Through Agent**

See Privacy Act Statement on Reverse

1. Date 11/20/2019

In consideration of delivery of my or our (firm) mail to the agent named below, the addressee and agent agree: (1) the addressee or the agent must not file a change of address order with the Postal Service™ upon termination of the agency relationship; (2) the transfer of mail to another address is the responsibility of the addressee and the agent; (3) all mail delivered to the agency under this authorization must be prepaid with new postage when redeposited in the mails; (4) upon request the agent must provide to the Postal Service all addresses to which the agency transfers mail; and (5) when any information required on this form changes or becomes obsolete, the addressee(s) must file a revised application with the Commercial Mail Receiving Agency (CMRA).

**NOTE:** The applicant must execute this form in duplicate in the presence of the agent, his or her authorized employee, or a notary public. The agent provides the original completed signed PS Form 1583 to the Postal Service and retains a duplicate completed signed copy at the CMRA business location. The CMRA copy of PS Form PS 1583 must at all times be available for examination by the postmaster (or designee) and the Postal Inspection Service. The addressee and the agent agree to comply with all applicable Postal Service rules and regulations relative to delivery of mail through an agent. Failure to comply will subject the agency to withholding of mail from delivery until corrective action is taken.

This application may be subject to verification procedures by the Postal Service to confirm that the applicant resides or conducts business at the home or business address listed in boxes 7 or 10, and that the identification listed in box 8 is valid.

2. Name in Which Applicant's Mail Will Be Received for Delivery to Agent. (Complete a separate Form 1583 for EACH applicant. Spouses may complete and sign one Form 1583. Two items of valid identification apply to each spouse. Include dissimilar information for either spouse in appropriate box.) KAHEN, JON			3a. Address to be Used for Delivery (Include PMB or # sign.) 15 Cuttermill Road # 251		
			3b. City GREAT NECK	3c. State NY	3d. ZIP + 4® 11021
4. Applicant authorizes delivery to and in care of:			5. This Authorization Is Extended to Include Restricted Delivery Mail for the Undersigned(s):		
a. Name Cuttermill Mailroom					
b. Address (No., street, apt./ste. no.) 15 Cuttermill Road					
c. City GREAT NECK	d. State NY	e. ZIP + 4 11021			
6. Name of Applicant JON KAHEN			7a. Applicant Home Address (No., street, apt./ste. no.) [REDACTED]		
8. Two types of identification are required. One must contain a photograph of the addressee(s). Social Security cards, credit cards, and birth certificates are unacceptable as identification. The agent must write in identifying information. Subject to verification			7b. City GREAT NECK		
			7c. State NY	7d. ZIP + 4® [REDACTED]	
a. Drivers license: [REDACTED]			7e. Applicant Telephone Number (Include area code) [REDACTED]		
b. Vehicle insurance policy: [REDACTED]			9. Name of Firm or Corporation		
			10a. Business Address (No., street, apt./ste. no.)		
Acceptable identification includes: valid driver's license or state non-driver's identification card; armed forces, government, university, or recognized corporate identification card; passport, alien registration card or certificate of naturalization; current lease, mortgage or Deed of Trust; voter or vehicle registration card; or a home or vehicle insurance policy. A photocopy of your identification may be retained by agent for verification.			10b. City		
			10c. State	10d. ZIP + 4®	
			10e. Business Telephone Number (Include area code)		
			11. Type of Business		
12. If applicant is a firm, name each member whose mail is to be delivered. (All names listed must have verifiable identification. A guardian must list the names of minors receiving mail at their delivery address.)					
13. If a CORPORATION, Give Names and Addresses of Its Officers			14. If Business Name of The Address (Corporation or Trade Name) Has Been Registered, Give Name of County and State, and Date of Registration.		
Warning: The furnishing of false or misleading information on this form or omission of material information may result in criminal sanctions (including fines and imprisonment) and/or civil sanctions (including multiple damages and civil penalties). (18 U.S.C. 1001)					
15. Signature of Agent/Notary Public			16. Signature of Applicant (If firm or corporation, application must be signed by officer. Show title.)		

# Exhibit 3

